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An FMEA on the training of staff to
evacuate patients from a hospital ward
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University
Peter Wilkinson and Charles Hancock explain how potential problems with training staff to
evacuate patients in an emergency were identified, leading to action to remedy them.
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), conducted on
the training of staff to evacuate patients from a hospital
ward, has identified 12 potential failure modes and
their effects. For most of these failure modes, an action has been
recommended to reduce their likelihood, reduce their consequences
or eliminate them completely. One identified failure mode,
however — the potential for trainees to suffer fatigue — does not
have a corresponding action. The effects of fatigue are unavoidable
and reflect the realities of patient evacuation. Successful staff
training requires effective and timely pre-planning, and good
communication and collaboration with managers at all levels,
ward staff and other professionals such as back care and infection
control specialists.
Healthcare fire safety
In hospital buildings, particularly in patient-access areas, the
immediate and total evacuation of the building in the event of a fire
may not be possible or desirable’. Patients with restricted mobility,
those who use wheelchairs and those confined to bed cannot negotiate
escape routes, particularly stairs, unaided. Patients under medication
may require staff assistance, and patients who are dependent on
electrical or mechanical equipment for their survival cannot always
be disconnected and moved rapidly without serious consequences.
The two main fire strategies used in healthcare premises are
“progressive horizontal evacuation” and “defend in place”2. The
principle of progressive horizontal evacuation is that of moving
occupants from an area affected by fire through a fire resisting
barrier to an adjoining area on the same level, designed to protect
the occupants from the immediate dangers of fire and smoke (a
refuge). The occupants may remain there until the fire is dealt with
or await further evacuation to another similar adjoining area or
down the nearest stairway. This procedure should give sufficient
time for non-ambulant and partially ambulant patients to be
evacuated down stairways to a place of safety, should it become
necessary to evacuate an entire storey’.
The principle of defend in place is to isolate patients and staff
from fire and smoke while emergency personnel respond to the
situation. It is not of primary relevance to this study.
Disaster planning is essential to develop a range ofprocedures to
cover potential events that could require the evacuation ofpatients.
Manion and Golden3 describe the importance ofpre-planning and
the multiple challenges presented to those undertaking the plan; the
reliability of vertical evacuation equipment (including elevators),
the manpower needed to transport patients, and the time needed
for stabilisation before patient transfer.
Training
Pre-planning for a fire is key to the success of safeguarding the
occupants of a hospital. As mandated in the Department of
Health’s fire safety policy framework , the overall aim in the event
of a fire is to ensure that all occupants can escape unharmed to a
place of safety either inside or outside the building. There must
be a prompt response to the alarm and an effective strategy for
evacuation. Therefore, a sufficient number of adequately trained
staff will need to be available to assist occupants who may be
unfamiliar with the building layout, or require assistance due to
their medical condition.
Fire safety training is essential for all hospital staff and is a legal
requirement under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, the
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 and
the Fire Safety Order 2006. Staff need to know what to do in the
event of fire so that fire safety procedures can be applied effectively.
It is therefore imperative that healthcare organisations provide
appropriate levels of fire safety training. The DH stipulates that
this applies to all members of staff without exception.
There are a number of organisational competence and ethical
issues that need to be considered in the training of students
Wilkinson8 describes the guidance available to fire safety
practitioners in the health sector, and advocates a flexible approach
to fire safety training programmes. Induction training must be given
before the commencement of work, and must include fire safety
material. Training for staff on night duty is particularly important
in the view of the reduced levels ofstaffing which apply at that time.
It is the responsibility of the healthcare organisation’s fire safety
manager to develop a modular training programme which reflects
staff responsibilities for fire safety and sets in place appropriate
means for recording and monitoring staff training.
It is expected that staff who are involved in the direct care of
patients, who are likely to need to help evacuate them, should
receive training more frequently than others. The type of training
should be based on the particular features of the premises and
should:
• take account of the findings of the fire risk assessment;
• explain the emergency procedures; and
• take account of the work activity and explain the duties and
responsibilities of staff.
Recent events, such as the fire at London’s Royal Marsden
Hospital on 2 January 2008 , demonstrate how crucial the
actions of well trained staff are when an emergency evacuation
is necessary.
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FMEA and healthcare FMEA
Since the 1960s, FMEA has been widely used as a tool for safety and
reliability analysis ofproducts and processes in a range of industries.
It is a technique to define, identify and eliminate known and/or
potential failures, problems, errors and so on from the system,
design, process, and/or service before they reach the customer.
The National Center for Patient Safety of the US Department of
Veterans Affairs adjusted FMEA to the healthcare setting, resulting
in the Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA)
HFMEA is a five-step process which uses a multidisciplinary team
to proactively evaluate the healthcare process.
It is suggested that the team use process flow diagramming,
a hazard scoring matrix and a decision tree to identify and assess
potential vulnerabilities. In this way, vulnerabilities are judged
by their likelihood of occurrence, their potential severity and
the ease at which they might be detected and intercepted before
causing harm.
The FMEA on staff training
This FMEA focused on the training of staff to evacuate patients
from a hospital ward both horizontally and vertically. It also
concentrated on the role played by the hospital’s fire safety manager
when planning, delivering and evaluating evacuation training.
Although in this case it was conducted by one person (the report’s
author) a multidisciplinary team would be preferable. For this topic,
it would be prudent to include nursing staff and ward managers,
estates and facilities professionals, portering stafl~ the health and
safety advisor and back care adviser, the human resources department,
senior management (to get their support and buy-in to the exercise),
and the evacuation equipment supplier (for advice regarding correct
use of horizontal and vertical evacuation aids). A patient may also
be a useful team member to give their perspective.
For this FMEA, there were a number of processes to describe,
and then break down into sub-processes. A high level description
of the main stages of hospital evacuation2 could be:
Horizontal evacuation from the sub-compartment where
the fire originates to an adjoining sub-compartment or
compartment.
Horizontal evacuation from the entire compartment where
the fire originates to an adjoining compartment on the same
floor.
Vertical evacuation to a lower floor substantially remote from
the floor of origin of the fire (at least two floors below), or to
the outside.
As defined by Gwynne etaI~2 the main activities (here numbered
1—5) involved in moving patients with their beds from one fire
zone, horizontally, to a neighbouring fire zone are:
1. prepare the patient;
2. move the patient out of a room;
3. move a patient to a place of relative safety;
4. place the patient in a safe location; and
5. return to pick up the next patient.
Similarly, the main activities (activities 6—10) in moving patients
vertically from the fire floor to a lower floor are:
6. prepare the patient to be lifted from the bed;
7. lower the patient from the bed;
8. move a patient to a place of relative safety on the lower floor;
9. place the patient in a safe location; and
10.return to pick up the next patient.
‘When conducting training for evacuation, further activities are
required (activities 11 16). Before training, one needs to:
11 .plan the scenario, ward type and patient type to be practised;
12.consulr with management regarding time, resources, and
objectives;
13.identify the individuals to receive the training;
14.identify the venue and equipment for training;
I 5.invite trainees; and
1 6.give a pre-training briefing and safety briefing.
Post-training, one must:
1 7.monitor and record effectiveness of the training;
18.provide feedback to trainees;
19.provide feedback to management; and
20.review policies and procedures to reflect any issues
encountered (updating them if necessary).
The fourth stage involves conducting a hazard analysis. For the
sub-processes identified under activities 1 20, all possible potential
failure modes were listed. Next, the severity and probability ofeach
was determined so as to understand which, if any, failure modes
were so serious as to warrant process redesign.
To this end, a risk priority number (RPN) for each potential
failure mode was established. The RPN is an index that expresses
the risk level priority associated with each failure mode . It is
determined by calculating the product of three indexes — severity,
frequency and detection.
Table 1 lists four sub processes, their activity number, identified
failure modes associated with them and their RPN scores (highest
first). For each of the failure mode causes identified, it was
necessary to determine whether to eliminate, control or to accept
the failure.
Common themes emerging from review
Analysis of the failure modes and causal factors in the FMEA has
led to the identification ofcommon themes. Correct planning and
execution of manual handling good practice was the first theme
identified, which is common to a few of the issues raised. Therefore,
it is crucial to take correct advice from back care specialists whilst
planning and conducting evacuation training, especially where the
training involves vertical escape.
This leads on to the second common theme identified from
analysis of causal factors, namely, problems that may come to
light if effective communication and collaboration with all levels
of management, ward staff and specialist colleagues is missing.
It reinforces the need for a collaborative approach to evacuation
training.
The third common theme involves the availability and reliability
of equipment and beds. In order to minimise the consequences
of disruption to training it is important that effective planning
allows for alternative arrangements such as the use of alternative
equipment, alternative venues such as in-ward training, or even
different types of training such as desk-top exercises.
In effect, the underlying causal factors can be reduced or removed
by ensuring effective planning, and effective communication and
collaboration.
It should be noted that the processes and sub-processes identified
through this FMF.A are not exhaustive. It may be necessary for
the fire safety manager to analyse further scenarios — including
evacuation of the whole hospital — in order to complete the range
of possible events requiring evacuation of patients.
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TABLE 1: FOUR KEY FAILURE MODES
Sub-process (~[~7rnTm1~T~) ~ Potential effect Gilfailure Risk [~xlt~II~3
rn~
Decide which patients to move in Volunteer patient suffers injury from Training terminates early and potential
priority order; assist first patient to incorrect handling longer-term issues for individual 84
move (activity 7) volunteer
Give background, describe objectives Foreign language speaking trainees Trainees make mistakes during training
of training, describe scenarios, conduct do not fully comprehend theory being putting themselves and others at risk 50
safety talk, gain consent (activity 16) discussed
Conduct vertical evacuation ‘ Trainee’s undisclosed back problem Training terminates early and potential 42
(activity 8) aggravated by lifting operation longer-term issues for individual trainee
Repeat process until all patients Trainees suffer fatigue Training terminates early 36
evacuated to lower level (activity 10)
Results and conclusions
This FMEA resulted in 12 potential failure modes of which four
are shown in table 1. For each of the failure modes, the potential
effect has been identified and an action recommended. Most of
these recommended actions result in a change to the failure mode,
whether by reducing the likelihood, reducing the consequences or
by eliminating the failure mode completely.
One identified failure mode, however, does not have a
corresponding action or beneficial result. The potential for trainees
to suffer fatigue when repeating vertical evacuation of patients has
an impact on the whether the training exercise has to be terminated
early, but the effects of fatigue are unavoidable, and reflect the
realities of effecting patient evacuation.
The underlying causal factors identified in this FMEA study
can be reduced or removed by ensuring effective and timely pre
planning, and effective communication and collaboration with all
levels of management, ward staff and other professionals, such as
back care and infection control specialists.
The study identified the following specific actions:
Use fully articulated training manikins in place of human
volunteers to retain realism, but ensure training does not
introduce unnecessary risks.
Ensure understanding of theory training via the assessment of
each trainee prior to practical training.
Ensure that all manual handling risks are fully discussed with
the trainee and that written consent is gained.
Ensure that adequate numbers of observing staff are available
to assist the fire safety manager.
Check all equipment and beds prior to training exercise, and
ensure that spares are available if required.
Ensure that desk-top exercises and on-ward training can be
undertaken as a reserve measure.
Plan training events well in advance, and send reminders to
trainees.
Although essentially a theoretical discourse, this FMF.A points
towards the failure modes that would be picked up by a more
rigorous process involving a full multidisciplinary team.
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